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Personal Narrative, Educational Research and Multipolar 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
Morwenna Griffiths 
University of Edinburgh 
 
1. Introduction 
 
I argue that the current discussion of cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitan order demonstrates that more attention 
needs to be paid to the significance of contextual as opposed to generalizable knowledge of education, especially in 
relation to diversity and injustice within and between regions of the world. This is a familiar, if not uncontroversial, 
epistemological position in educational research, except that many such arguments ignore the unjust distribution of 
resources, voice and influence across the post-colonial world. This injustice has been widely discussed in relation to 
economic and macro-politics but is less often noticed in relation to the global use of educational research in policy and 
practice. In this article I argue that the use of personal narrative research may be a means for the less resourced, less 
heard, less influential parts of the world to resist implementing educational policy which is based in research carried 
out in other contexts, and which may be pernicious in its unintentional effects.  It may also be a way of persuading the 
West to relinquish its modernist hope of overarching universals of propositional and practical knowledge, and 
acknowledge that the world is not only plural but variously multipolar, a world in which a range of poles exist in 
tension with the others.  
 
2. Relation to Understandings of Cosmopolitanism  
 
The terminology of the cosmopolitan order – and of cosmopolitanism itself – are much discussed and contested. The 
term, ‘cosmopolitan order’ was originally coined by Held, who was proposing a normative model in distinction from 
the merely descriptive and ambiguous term, ‘globalisation’ (Held, 1992).  He argues for an ‘authoritative assembly of 
all democratic states and societies’ (p.34) in which the ‘multiple and overlapping networks of power’ (p.36), 
characteristic of current circumstances of economic, political and social global activity, could alter ‘the dynamics of 
resource production and distribution and of rule creation and enforcement’ (p.36). He argues that he is not proposing a 
particular, current model of democracy which is based on an assumption of the nation state, but allowing for 
contending models to be rethought in relation to local, regional and global processes and structures. However he then 
goes on to say that such a ‘cosmopolitan model of democracy assumes the entrenchment of a cluster of rights, 
including civil, political, economic and social rights in order to provide shape and limits to democratic decision-
making’ (p.34).  So whatever his protestations, it is clear that he is assuming a bedrock of liberal – rights-based – 
policy. 
Since Held wrote, the literature on cosmopolitanism has burgeoned. Two themes have recurred. They are the 
conceptual polarities between universalism and difference and between cosmopolitanism from above and from below. 
Held began the process of critical reassessment of them, in the context of cosmopolitanism. He pointed out that 
‘globalism and cultural diversity are not simply opposites…the issue is how and in what way cultures are linked and 
interrelated’ (p.37) and that ‘the problems of global governance from above cannot be solved by grassroots democracy 
alone. For the questions have to be posed: which grassroots and which democracy.’ (p.38)  Held’s brief pointers have 
been vigorously taken up.1 Resolutions of the former are inevitably related to resolutions of the latter. As Strand 
(2010a, p.105) says, in summarising contributions to a special issue on cosmopolitanism:  
 
A vital dilemma is…the tension between an abstract universalism from above versus a concrete moral 
commitment from below… The dilemma remains unresolved.  
 
One influential commentator has been Appiah (2006, 2006-7). He argues for a cosmopolitan order based less in world 
government than in ‘subsidiarity’ and in conversations. As he says, he (2007, p.2381):  
 
cannot literally converse with the other six billion strangers who inhabit the planet…but a global community of 
cosmopolitans will want to learn about other ways of life through anthropology, history, novels, music and news 
stories. 
 
Like Held, his approach is rooted in liberalism, but less a rights-based one than one which draws on Mill’s views  that 
each individual should do what they themselves believe to be right; that ‘the dignity of each human being resides, in 
part, in his or her capacity for and right to self-management’ (Appiah, 2007, p.2380).  Like Appiah, Mouffe argues for 
a non-relativistic pluralism.  However, for her it is human dignity which is key (2008, p.456). This is not based in 
Western liberal democratic rights, or in an autonomous, non-relational self but rather holds that human dignity is more 
fundamental. She contrasts those wanting Held’s cosmopolitan order with those who are wanting a pluriverse, a 
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multipolar world order (464). Rather than a single rule by Reason she argues for agonistic coexistence between 
different regional poles (466).  
  These themes have been taken up in education in relation to citizenship education, education for social justice and 
the necessity for universal global ethics underpinning education policy. The debates have generated both light and heat, 
as is illustrated in the content and the title of symposium, ‘Philosophy of Education and the Gigantic Affront of 
Universalism’ in which the issues of universalism, qualified universalism and cultural translation are all placed within 
the context of addressing social injustice globally and locally (Enslin, Tjiattas and Todd, 2009). Hansen is an example 
of a theorist who is less interested in the macro-political focus, and instead takes up the theme of cosmopolitanism 
from below, identifying a strand he calls ‘cosmopolitanism from the ground up’ (Hansen, 2010, p.4). This strand 
focuses on the art of living which is rooted in the everyday context and so can only find expression in the local – but 
not, he is keen to emphasise, in the parochial (Hansen 2010, p.5):  
 
What characterises cosmopolitanism from the ground up is a fusion, sometimes tenuous and tension-laden, of 
receptivity to the new and loyalty to the known.  
 
Hansen is also keen to emphasise that this kind of cosmopolitanism (p.5) ‘challenges stereotypical views of the 
cosmopolitan as an elite and rootless standpoint in the world.’ In a series of articles, Todd (2007, 2010) argues that 
simple openness or receptivity will not solve dissonance. Drawing on Mouffe she argues instead for an agonistic 
cosmopolitics in which democratic discussion based on rights is only one way of dealing with cultural difference, and 
that other forms of politics (including the wearing of the hijab) must also be part of an agonistic accommodation in 
living peacefully with dissonance. Papastephanou (2011a, 2011b) criticises what she calls ‘culturalism’ in Hansen and 
others as a world view from the West which overlooks the historical, political, postcolonial contexts of multicultural 
encounters. Rizvi (2009) argues that cosmopolitan learning should be reflexive, by which he means (p.267) 
 
a critical recognition of our own cultural and political presuppositions, and the epistemic position from which 
we speak and negotiate difference. 
 
Almost all this work focuses on the implications for classroom practices or educational policies in the West. Moreover 
some critics have pointed out how far it remains with the interest and interests of the relatively powerful West. As 
Rizvi (2005, n.p.) says, ‘cultural interaction and exchange…occurs within the logic of consumption, under the new 
global economic conditions’. As Papastephanou says, even if we are on our guard culturally and politically (2011, 
p.601): 
 
It is the self that primarily benefits from the intercultural formation and not the Other who might be affected by 
such formation only by implication.  
 
In this article I want to shift the focus from what should be done in and for Western educational practices to the spread 
of Western policies and practices to the rest of the world in a variety of ways. These include educational aid and 
consultancy, Western universities selling degree programmes around the world, and academic publishing of books and 
Journals. Therefore the focus of interest takes in more than diversity and ethics; it also addresses diversity and 
knowledge. Some educational knowledge may be of what Austin (1962) called ‘moderate size specimens of dry goods’ 
but more is of the social, historical and cultural world. This has largely been constructed and built on a basis of 
research and practice in the West. It is then used to inform educational practices and policies in aid and consultancy. It 
is also the basis of international programmes in education. The research basis of equivalent social, historical and 
cultural knowledge in relatively less powerful countries is much smaller, and much, much harder to access, even for 
their own citizens.  
 
3. An unjust world of unequal difference 
 
All too often, it is assumed by Westerners that knowledge generated in their own specific contexts is generalizable 
across all countries and cultures. This assumption has purchase in relation to science, technology and engineering, 
much of which concern moderate size dry goods. It may also have purchase in relation to much international finance 
and multinational business. However with regard to educational knowledge of pedagogy and policy, this assumption 
can carry little credibility. The underlying philosophies, world views, geographical, political, economic and historical 
contexts are all likely to be significantly different in other places. As Michael Peters has explained in an interview 
about editing Educational Philosophy and Theory, the West now has the obligation to recognise both the post-colonial 
positionality of indigenous peoples in the world and also the classical traditions of theory and philosophy that belong to 
other countries like China and India (Peters, 2013).  
Western consultants too often assume that what has meaning or efficacy in their own pedagogical and policy 
contexts is easily translated into any other culture. They also often assume that they themselves are cosmopolitans 
when they are better described as ‘frequent travellers’ or cultural tourists. Goetze’s interviews with 71 of the civilian 
staff of a United Nations Mission in Kosovo indicates that their cosmopolitanism is ‘politically firmly rooted in the 
historical and ideological experience of the West’ (2013, p.91). For instance, when she asked for their political 
‘heroes’, over 90%  mentioned either Mahatma Ghandi or Nelson Mandela and the only other heroes from outside the 
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first world were Lenin, Guevara, and Atatürk. There is no reason to believe that this perspective would be very 
different in education, even among those who themselves theorise cosmopolitanism and value openness. Hansen for 
instance, lists as ‘remarkable cosmopolitans’  Mohandas Ghandi, Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King and Nelson 
Mandela (2010, p.4) – a list that fits well with Goetze’s findings. Research by Fazal Rizvi and Michael Singh (Rizvi, 
2005) indicates that international students in Western institutions of Higher Education take on Western ideas about 
cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. They interviewed Asian students after they had completed Higher Education 
studies in Australia. There was disturbing evidence that they conceptualised themselves as transnational or global, 
insofar as they located themselves as able to operate in a global market. It was clear that Western goods and ideas 
counted as ‘global’ for them while their own home localities did not.   
As the Palestinian scholar, André Elias Mazawi says, the notions of the knowledge society and of development 
have to be understood in relation to configurations of power – national, regional and global – over the backdrop of 
struggles which occur over what is defined as knowledge and what is valued as development (Mazawi, 2008a). Taking 
the example of knowledge about educational leadership, he points out that (Mazawi, 2008b, 80): 
 
The uncritical extension to the Arab region of educational leadership models developed in Western societies 
dismisses vital cultural dimensions of local contexts of conflict and their political and geopolitical 
underpinnings. This effectively attracts attention away from the core social and political issues that impact 
schooling in the Arab region. It also constructs educational leadership in ways that operate an ontological and 
epistemic disjuncture between the experiential realities of educators and the formal ways through which their 
professional judgements and performance are assessed.  
 
In a thoughtful article reflecting on her years of experience as a Westerner working in the Education sector in Africa, 
Brigit Brock-Utne explores the issue of the West exporting assumptions about knowledge and education. She draws on 
the work of Catherine Odora, a Ugandan scholar, who (Brock-Utne, 2002, 76):  
 
discusses the need for creating a space in contemporary education discourse that is more tolerant, more sensitive 
to realities other than the overwhelming Western one. She finds that discussing indigenous education today 
compels us to come to terms with the situation in which even the social construction of a people’s reality is and 
has been constantly defined elsewhere. Discussing indigenous education, according to Odora, ‘is about asking 
why the school building is always quadrangled even where the local setting around it has round huts’ (Odora, 
1994: 62 - italics added by Brock-Utne). 
 
Brock-Utne and Odora also draw attention to oversimplifications and homogenisations found in terms such as ‘the 
developing world’ or ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. Such oversimplifications distort the facts. Consider three countries: 
Botswana, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone. They are all in ‘the developing world’, they are all African; they are all sub-
Saharan; and they all use English as a medium of education. But there are immense differences between them. They 
each have very different histories, particularly in relation to their encounters with Europe and North America: their 
experiences of wars, conquests, trade, colonialisation and international aid. Their populations live in very different 
religious and cultural contexts, and they differ hugely in their physical geographies. It should also not be forgotten that 
there are big differences within each of these countries in terms of: languages spoken; cultural practices; living 
conditions in rural and urban areas; religion; settlement in highlands, lowlands, deserts and forest; and political 
relationships to the government.  
 
4. Scientism and oversimplification in a diverse world:  
    The example of literacy  
 
In the face of oversimplification and the diversity it conceals, the question arises: what kinds of knowledge are needed 
in education? Very often policy makers and international aid agencies assume a need for generalizable and universal 
knowledge: knowledge that applies everywhere, all the time and to everybody – and to easily measurable attributes. 
This view has been termed scientism, a view that as Smeyers (2010) remarks not only privileges numbers and statistics, 
but also easily slips from using them to represent one aspect of reality to thinking that they represent reality. This is a 
view that the world is best understood as composed of measurable entities which can be understood independently of 
observer, context or political relations. But scientism doesn’t even apply to science and certainly not to the social as a 
whole, as is well documented (e.g. Latour 1987, 2004). There is no doubt that measurement and the resulting statistics 
are often significant and relevant for policy and practice.  To take just the example of literacy rates: it is useful for 
policy makers to gather statistics about literacy levels among the population. And it may be useful for them to know the 
percentage of that population who are, for example, girls, or migrants, or who live in the city.  
While policy makers need to know these broad similarities, on their own they are not enough to guide policy. 
Literacy statistics need to be known, but if educational policy makers – or teachers – want to do something about 
literacy, then they need to know something about the reasons behind the numbers: why some students are not literate, 
and why some sections of the student population (girls, migrants, urban dwellers) are more (or less) literate than others. 
Equally, teachers need to know much more about the individual and groups of human beings who are their students, 
before they can decide on the best approach to teaching literacy.  So far this paragraph has been written as if ‘literacy’ 
was a well understood concept across countries and cultures. If that were true, perhaps there would be only a little 
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contextualisation needed to augment any generalized knowledge.  But the idea of literacy comes laden with cultural, 
social, economic, historical, religious and political overtones which affect how they are understood in different 
contexts. The different contexts and understanding mean any statistical model would have to work with an unfeasibly 
large number of variables.  
Some personal experience of mine may help focus the argument I want to make. In what follows I use specific 
examples to point up some of the complexities in thinking about literacy, resulting from differences and inequalities 
between and within different countries. In doing so I am also demonstrating the power of the individual, context-
dependent, human story to show situations which are not generalizable, but which are instructive.  
The first situation I offer comes from Botswana. Botswana, like so many countries, has many peoples in it, 
including the San peoples (formerly known to much of the world as Bushmen). Imagine the scene. I am visiting a Year 
5 class (ages 9 and upward) in a school deep in rural Botswana. It has taken hours to reach it from the nearest small 
town, driving not on tar but on deep sand. The school is indeed, as Catherine Odoro says, one of the few rectangular 
buildings in the village. The other one is the small shop and bar. Otherwise the buildings are neat, round houses each 
set in a fenced compound. The school group of buildings includes the teachers’ homes. The teachers live apart from the 
rest of the village in rectangular government houses. Unlike the villagers who are all San people, they are native 
speakers of Setswana. The language of education is Setswana and English. About thirty children sit at desks in a room 
largely bare of educational materials like posters, books, and equipment for specific curriculum activities. I take a 
photograph of one of the children. It would be hard to tell from the photograph that she is not from the UK. She sits at a 
desk, in her blue uniform (provided by the government), resting her hand on her cheek, her elbow on her desk, her 
pencil in her hand, looking down at the exercise book in which she should be writing. Children in primary schools 
often look like this: writing is difficult.  
The next situation I offer is again from a rural primary school, but this time in the USA. I took a photograph when I 
was there, doing some research with the teacher in a first year class (ages 6-7). The picture shows a corner of this well-
stocked classroom of about twenty pupils. A child at the front is sitting at a desk, working at a large sheet of paper, 
making a story book by drawing and writing. In the background is a large display board decorated with cartoon 
characters, with speech bubbles coming out of their mouths. Children’s work is mounted on the board, under the 
heading ‘Our Wintry Work’. (There was deep snow outside.) Above this is another notice: ‘WRITING’. There is also a 
set of shelves with boxes of writing implements and piles of paper for the children to use.  
The third situation comes from the UK. This time I am visiting a city school for pupils with severe or profound 
learning disabilities. Again I take a photograph, this time of two teenagers. They are learning to make films using 
video. Many of them communicate much better through visual means than through words or writing.  I am there so that 
they can interview me as part of their project. My photograph shows two young people and a technician standing round 
the tripod where the video camera is mounted. Later they will learn to edit it and integrate the interview into a longer 
film.  
Each of these situations are ones in which a basic literacy is being taught. All of them are state schools: these 
students are benefiting from the ordinary policy and practice of their countries. However the differences are immediate, 
striking and significant. What is the meaning of literacy for the San child? And what literacy policy and pedagogical 
practices are appropriate for her? She is learning to write in her second or third language; her classroom has a few 
books, all text books; the displays are posters from the education ministry; her home and village contains very little 
printed material of any kind and very little electronic equipment either (she will be pleased to get a copy of my 
photograph); she is unlikely to go on to secondary, let alone tertiary education (though it is possible). In contrast, the 
six year old children in the USA are learning to write in their first language; the classroom is full of books and other 
printed material, including text books but also including books and posters for the children simply to enjoy; the 
children come from homes full of printed material of all kinds, even if their parents are not well-educated, and there is 
an abundance of electronic devices, including cameras, recorders, mobile phones and computers with internet access. 
All these children will continue their education at secondary level and most of them at tertiary level too. The teenagers 
in the UK are different again. They have severe learning disabilities, but are able to achieve a beginning of media 
literacy, something that is increasingly relevant as electronic communication expands. However they, like the children 
in the USA, are surrounded by print and books, at school and at home. And they will be very familiar with television, 
video, films, posters, and photographs. It is likely that in spite of their learning disabilities they will be able to 
understand a lot about public communications and the uses of verbal and visual literacies.  
Literacy statistics hide these significant differences. Indeed even if all the independent variables could be identified 
there are too many of them for any useful statistics to be generated. With simplistic statistical approaches adding more 
variables to a correlation increases the correlation, until it is 1.0 when there are the same number of variables, however 
meaningless, as there are observations. The loss in the degrees of freedom as the number of variables increases makes 
the results increasingly useless. Specification errors are inevitable: correlation, for example, normally uses hypotheses 
specifying linear, log or geometric responses – which can be plotted by a line on a graph. However, there are 
indications from qualitative research that many of the relationships between two variables in education are much more 
complicated, and when other factors are introduced the interplay becomes very complex indeed. In the case of literacy, 
research into ‘book floods’ shows that relevant factors include accessibility, display, quality of book, teacher education, 
cultural attitudes to teaching and whether or not the students live in a print culture (Elly, Cutting, Mangubhai and 
Hugo, 1996;  Raban, Brown and Scull, 2009).  
Further, the different definitions of literacy used in statistics would generate different sets of variables. Commonly 
used definitions of literacy will give very different results (and imply different strategies) for these children. One 
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widely used criterion in sub-Saharan Africa, ‘the ability to read easily or with difficulty a letter or a newspaper’, may 
be compared with another equally widely used, ‘can with understanding both read and write a short simple statement 
on his or her everyday life’. (See Aitcheson and Alidou, 2009.) What would those two statements mean to the San 
child? to the American child? to the British teenagers? The meaning attached to a letter or a newspaper is not the same 
cross culturally. Even the ability to write a short statement will mean something different to a child in a community 
where literacy is needed and assumed, and to a child where it is not. So what policy is needed about literacy levels? 
And how should teachers approach the task of teaching children to read and to use electronic communication?   
 
5. Trustworthy narratives 
 
My narratives are not the products of research. They function in this argument as rhetoric and illustration. I offer them 
in the hope they have achieved their purpose of drawing attention to the significance of understanding specific contexts 
in order to interpret information gathered more generally and of how assumptions that are made by Westerners about 
those contexts may be seriously mistaken. You, the reader, may believe them, but equally you may be sceptical. For 
me, the story teller, they are part of my own personal knowledge, but I am well aware that they are not presented in a 
way that would mean that you, the reader, have good reasons to trust them. To take this point further, I may have tried 
to be strictly faithful to the facts or I may have fictionalised some aspects of the stories, perhaps in order to maintain 
confidentiality, or to bring together various aspects of the truth as I perceive it.  
Personal and experiential knowledge need not remain simply personal. It can be presented as research. As 
previously argued in Griffiths and Macleod (2008) it is possible to produce trustworthy research-based knowledge of 
particular contexts. Such research is based in an epistemology of the unique and particular, a phrase I take from the 
philosopher Cavarero (2002). Just as with an epistemology of the general and universalizable, an epistemology of the 
unique and particular must have a means of establishing sound, trustworthy knowledge distinguishable from the 
anecdotes, songs, poems, performances or images used rhetorically.  The epistemology of the unique and particular is 
recognisable as a version of Aristotelian praxis read through the lens of Arendt’s (1958) related concepts of the bios 
politicos and natality. As Cavarero helpfully puts it, praxis is concerned with the 'shared and relational space generated 
by the words and deeds of a plurality of human beings' (Cavarero, 2002, p.506).2 Praxis, unlike Aristotelian techne, 
requires personal wisdom and understanding. Joseph Dunne has usefully interpreted it as follows: 
 
[Praxis] is conduct in a public space with others in which a person, without ulterior purpose and with a view to 
no object detachable from himself, acts in such a way as to realise excellences that he has come to appreciate in 
his community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life. ... praxis required for its regulation a kind of 
knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more supple and less formulable, than the knowledge 
conferred by techne. (1993, p. 10) 
 
Praxis is created from evidence gathered personally as well as from others, and applied with intelligence, judgement 
and logic.  
The soundness of a claim to knowledge is assessed on the grounds of both truth and validity. Therefore personal 
narratives used as research need to be demonstrably trustworthy in relation to both. I now briefly consider each in turn.  
I begin with truth. In assessing a narrative, judgements about truth are preceded by judgements about truthfulness. 
Here I am drawing on Bernard Williams’ useful distinction between truth and truthfulness (Williams, 2002).3 He 
argues that there are two basic virtues associated with truthfulness: accuracy and sincerity. Judging accuracy and 
sincerity is a matter for judgement, for weighing evidence, for weighing up reasons to trust the teller. It is difficult to 
do.  There are no infallible rules to guide these judgements about truthfulness. However it is a familiar difficulty which 
we human beings overcome in order simply to carry on living in families, communities and society at large.  In 
ordinary life we listen to and tell stories all the time.  We need to judge how far they are accurate and told with 
sincerity.  We know, and indeed expect, them to be partial, self-serving, entertaining, persuasive and to draw on 
imperfect memories. Judgements are even more difficult in the case of accounts which are fictionalised, sometimes 
ironic, or which are poetic or visual representations.  Again, it is a familiar difficulty. Myths, fables, riddles, humour 
and images are used the world over to convey truths (e.g. see Bridges, 2003; Sparkes, Nilges, Swan, and Dowling, 
2003; Walker  and Unterhalter, 2004; Griffiths and Peters, 2012).  
Researchers presented with a narrative must make judgements about the truthfulness of the narrator. Of course, they 
do this at a personal level, producing personal knowledge, but research is public knowledge. Therefore, researchers 
need both to make their judgements public and also to give an indication of the reasons for the way in which their 
judgements were reached.  A researcher also needs to present the audience with evidence of how stories were 
produced, with what intended audience, and for what purpose – and with what funding. All of these factors affect 
judgements of accuracy and sincerity.  
I now turn to validity. I begin by emphasising that the validity in question is not the validity of data in science, let 
alone of scientism, where numeric measurement is a basic tool. Qualitative researchers have suggested a number of 
different approaches to the issue of validity in research where numeric measurement is not being used, including, for 
example, rhizomatic validity, crystalline validity, and respondent validation. In Griffiths and Macleod (2008) we 
developed an account of validity which starts from older uses of the term: the ‘ordinary language’ understanding which 
does not require either measurement or certainty. It is the responsibility of researchers to present research in such a way 
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that judgements can be made about its validity by their audiences. To enable this, sound research needs to show that the 
researcher has taken account of representativeness, bias and the possibility of reframing the question. Sometimes a 
narrative is significant because it reflects a common situation, and sometimes it is significant precisely because it 
reflects an unusual one. It is important to know which is being claimed and why. Research is also distinguished from 
anecdote or polemic by attention to representation, genre and literary quality: the way that a personal narrative is 
presented.4 The researcher should try to clarify what kinds of reflective and reflexive choices and judgements were 
made about, for instance, the medium used to present it, any fictions used, and the literary decisions about chronology, 
hero narratives, etc.  Researchers need to set their judgments within their understanding of the cultural, social, political 
and personal contexts. 
Personal narrative and stories use an epistemology of the unique and the particular. The knowledge that they 
generate is not the same as knowledge that comes from epistemologies of the general and universal. There are no 
timeless truths to be uncovered. There are no laws to be formulated. Contextual knowledge is probably more useful 
than generalised knowledge when formulating and carrying out complex educational policy or when carrying on the 
complicated business of teaching. For these purposes factual knowledge is less useful than qualities of understanding 
and wisdom. Stories made public and understood within the framework of individual experiences help cultivate these 
qualities. They show us other aspects of our world and in doing so illuminate our own small part of it. They help us 
question what we have taken for granted, to broaden our comprehension, and to deepen our insights.  
 
6. Conclusions 
My conclusion is Janus faced. I do not want to decry the usefulness of aid, degree programmes or academic publishing. 
Nor am I concerned to present another version of ‘ground up cosmopolitanism’ or of Held’s regionally multipolar 
world order. Rather I am concerned to argue for an acknowledgement of the specific polarities within the interactions 
between those who can sell their knowledge or who are part of educational aid programmes, and those who buy it or 
are asked to accept what is offered through aid. Acknowledgement would require an explicit acceptance that 
knowledge constructed in one context is only partially fit for purpose in another. The social, material, topological, 
cultural, linguistic, historical, political context in any region is relevant in understanding how far any knowledge may 
be useful.  
Personal narratives and other stories in educational research are also a way for the majority of the world to put the 
knowledge constructed in the West into its place: useful, but only insofar as it is relevant to the particular contexts at 
hand. Thus, stories, especially when presented as research, are an essential tool for developing countries in formulating 
their own solutions and resolutions to their own educational issues and problems. Such research does not require the 
extensive resource base that educational research enjoys in the richer parts of the world where educational research has 
been established – and funded – for decades. Moreover, knowledge expressed in stories seems to engage the memory 
and emotions in a way that drier modes of expression do not. It cannot be an accident that stories told in language, 
dance and song are found, repeated and enjoyed all over the world.  
In the long run there might even be the happy possibility that Westerners’ self-belief in their own rightness and 
universality might be shaken. As I remarked in Griffiths (2012) there are indications that those parts of the world, such 
as China or India, which are already presenting a challenge to Western economic dominance, are also challenging 
orthodox Western views about appropriate strategies in Higher Education policies (Griffiths, 2012). So, like Peters, I 
want to find ways of positioning educational research, theory and philosophy in a post-colonial world. Speaking of 
Australia and New Zealand he says (2013, n.p.): 
 
Here over 500 languages, 500 peoples and their works and ideas have hardly appeared in English philosophy 
journals. So we have an obligation to indigenous peoples… How do we make sense in an English speaking 
world, of Confucian societies, that have great respect for the scholar, with an English speaking world…To what 
extent can we collaborate and what will that mean for a world which is based on the concept of full participation 
in an educational society – one that demands an educational equality. 
  
NOTES 
 
1. See the useful overviews in Hansen (2010) and Strand (2010b).  
2. Cavarero herself does not draw directly on Aristotle though she does use the term ‘praxis’ in one of her quotations from 
Arendt.  
3. As Williams points out the word, ‘truth’ is much more difficult to assess anyway, because the meaning of the term is itself 
hotly contested. Indeed this contest is signalled by the way ‘truth’ often appears in scare quotes in educational research literature. 
Whatever allegiance any individual researcher has to one or other definitions of ‘truth’, it is much easier to agree on truthfulness 
which is often all that it is necessary to establish in narrative (and other qualitative) research. 
4. For example, They might be romantic (heroes and villains), epideictic (assigning praise or blame) or scientistic (expressing 
timeless universal truths from data). 
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